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AND GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
FORECLOSURE
1. Tender was made before Respondent affirmatively accelerated.
2. Respondent waived any default which may
have occured.
3. Reasonable notice of intent to require strict
performance of the contract (strict performance had heretofore not been required) in the
future was not given.
4. Respondent's attempted acceleration was
waived by its subsequent demand for payment
of the December payment with late charge.
5. All of the above are issues of fact and should
have been tried by a jury.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AIVIERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
\"S.

WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTH E.
BLOMQUIST, his wife, ZIONS SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation, JOSEPH E. NELSON, and
PEOPLE'S FINANCE & THRIFT, a cor-

Case No.
10,856

poration,

Defendants and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Suit by American Savings & Loan to Foreclose a real
estate mortgage on residence of Wayne T. & Ruth E.
Blomquist.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Court discharged jury without hearing evidence and
awarded judgment of foreclosure of said mortgage in the
nature of summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Blomquists seek an order determining that Resp ,.
OnJe,:
was not entitled to accelerate the unpaid mortgag d ' ,
e er,,
balance at the time that it purported to do so or · , ·
m .h.
alternative for a new trial with a jury.
·
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are indebted to Respondent on a note anl
mortgage (Exhibits P-1 and P-2). Appellants were late
in making most of the payments due on that loan and
late charges of $5.94 per late payment were assessed. Ir:
addition to the monthly payment on principal and \Lterest of the note, appellants were required to pay 3
monthly installment to Respondent to be accumulatei
for payment of property taxes and insurance on the mo::'tgaged premises. Respondent increased the escrow fund
payment by $2.00 effective December 15, 1963, but Appellants disputed their right to increase payments and
failed to increase their remittal by this $2.00.
Appellants also disputed Respondent's right to assess
a late charge and failed to remit late charges during approximately the last year. On December 14, 1964 Respondent made demand upon Appellants to pay the following amounts (Exhibit P-4):
November 15 payment
11 payments short at $2.00 (Escrow)
14 unpaid late fees at $5.94
Total Demanded

$149.00
22.00
83.16
$254.16

In that letter Respondent stated that it would not accept
a partial payment and that if payment were made after
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December 25, 1964 that it would be necessary to include
the December 15, 1964 payment.
On December 21, 1964 (R. 132) Appellants tendered
to Respondent (Exhibit D-8) (R. 130-131) in
payment of the $118. 75 principal and interest due on
November 15, 1964, and in payment of all but $2.00 of
the amount that should have been paid into the escrow
fund with the November payment, but Appellants did
:iot include a tender of the $22.00 prior underpayments
t.o the escrow fund or the $83.16 late charges that had
been demanded by Respondent. (Exhibit P-4).
~Hi.00

On December 28, 1964 Respondent rejected the tender
and returned that check with a letter (Exhibit P-5)
wherein it, in effect, indicated that the tender was rejected because it did not include the escrow fund underpayments and late charges demanded in its letter of
December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4). In the letter of December 28, 1964 (Exhibit P-5) Respondent stated that
it would waive late charges on the December 15, 1964
payment (which was then also past due) if it were paid
at that time. Respondent did not in that letter refuse the
tender because the December 15, 1964 payment had not
been included as contended by counsel. (R. 131) Nothing
was said in that letter which would in any manner put
Appellants upon notice that Respondent was even considering declaring the entire balance of the note to be
due.
Appellant again tendered the $147.00 check (Exhibit
D-8) to Respondent about January 6, 196~ which tender
was again rejected by a letter of January 6, 196$° (Ex-

4
hibit P-6) wherein Respondent made reference t .
o ono,
correspon d ence ( Ex P-4 & P-5) and reJ· ected th ' .
e tenat:·
because the amount was less than had been de
,·
ma1iue·1
In that letter Respondent also assessed a late ch
·
arge er
the December 15, 1964 payment and in effect den
'
, 1ancte
payment of the following amounts:
November 15 payment
December 15 payment
11 payments short at $2.00 (escrow)
15 late fees at $5.94
Total Demanded

$149.00
149.00
22.00
89.10
$409.10

Nothing was said in that letter about accelerating th~
balance due on the note. Respondent stated in that lette'
that the amount demanded " ... must reach our office
immediately if additional expense and inconvenience are
to be eliminated."
Appellant again tendered the $147.00 check (Exhibit
D-8) about January 8, 1965, which tender was rejected
by Respondents through their letter of January 8, 1965
from their attorney (Exhibit P-7) wherein Respondent
declared the full amount of the mortgage debt due and
payable.
About January 14, 1965 Appellants tendered an
amount in the excess of the amount demanded by Re·
spondent in the letter of January 6, 1965, which tender
was rejected by Respondent (Exhibit D-9). About Jan·
uary 21, 1965 and February 3, 1965 Appellants tendered
all amounts demanded by Respondents in their letter
of January 6, 1965 plus the January payment, which ten-
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ders were also rejected by Respondents (Exhibit D-10

and D-12 l.
On or about January 23, 1965, Appellants received a
demand from Respondent for payment of $409.16 due as
ot December 15, 1964 including late charges (Exhibit
D-l U, (R. 127-128). Respondents dispute the date that
said notice was received. (R. 127-128).
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE JURY AND
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF FORECLOS-

URE

After extensive pre-trial hearings before Judge Elton
and a demand by Appellants for trial by jury the case
was set by Judge Elton for jury trial. The morning of the
trial after the jury was in the court room and defendants
were ready to proceed with their evidence the Court dismissed the jury and granted summary judgment of foreclosure against Defendants without permitting Defendants to present evidence. (R 117). Several substantial
factual issues remained which should have been submitted to the jury, which if resolved in favor of Defendants would have resulted in a judgment in favor of Defendants, including the following:
1. Whether the check dated December 21, 1964 (Exhibit D-8) was tendered prior to or after the 25th day of
December, 1964. If the tender were made prior to that
date as contended by Appellants (R. 132) then the tender
would not be insufficient because the 10 day grace period
on the December 15, 1964 payment had not then passed.
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Respondents contend that this tender was rejected be
cause the December 15, 1964 payment was not t d ·
en ere<
(R. 131). This is an issue of fact that should hav 1. · ·
e uee··
submitted to the jury.
..
2. In the amende~ pre-trial order (R. 77, Par. 3) the
Court set up as an issue of fact to be determined bv, ,,
.
.
• 1h,
Jury the issue as to whether the Respondent by its letter
of December 14, 1964 (Ex. P-4) waived any existincr0 lit-i •
fault by Appellants and was therefore not entitled ;
accelerate the note and demand payment in full as it at~
tempted to do on January 8, 1965 (Exhibit P-7). After
that waiver no new default occurred which would entitl?
Respondent to accelerate the note. The jury could well
have found that Respondent had by its letter of Decembe.·
14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) elected to collect a late charge by
reason of the late payment for November, 1964, and tha:
accordingly any attempt to accelerate was premature
That letter expressly states the Respondent had electec
to collect a late charge and had not then elected to accelerate. It further states that it would not be necessary
to include the December 15, 1964 payment unless payment was made after December 25, 1964. The pre-trial
order determined the issues to be tried by the jury. The
Court erred in refusing to submit those issues to the jury
and in refusing to permit Appellants to present evidence
in support thereof.
3. Whether or not the letters sent to Appellants by

Respondents (Exhibit P-4 of December 14, 1964; Exhibit
P-5 of December 28, 1964; and Exhibit P-6 of January 6,
1964) gave Appellants reasonable notice of intent not to
continue to accept late payments, charging only a late
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charge for the delinquency, and of their intent to suddenly shift their position by accelerating the note and
mortgage balance. The jury could well have found from
those letters and other evidence that Respondent failed
to give reasonable notice to Appellants and therefore
had no right to accelerate after toleration of delinquent
payments over such a long period of time. Pacific De1:elopment Company v. Stewart (1948 Ut.) 195 P.2d. 748;
Ashback v. Wenzel (1959) 141 Colo. 35, 346 P2d. 295;
Edwards v. Smith ( 1959, Mo.) 322 S.W.2d. 770; Scelza
v Ryba (1957) 10 Misc. 2d. 186, 169 N.Y.S. 2d, 462; Brown
,. Hewitt (1940 Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S.W.2d. 223. See
iurther 97 A.L.R. 2d. 1006 - 1008.
In the Brown v. Hewitt case cited above the court held
that where plaintiff had, for 14 consecutive months, accepted from defendant overdue installments on a note
plaintiff would not be permitted suddenly to revert to
the terms of the note so as to enforce an optional acceleration clause, based on a subsequent installment which
was paid 4 days late, without first giving defendant specific notice of his intention.
The Utah Supreme Court has reached exactly the same
conclusion in Pacific Development Company v. Stewart.
195 P.2d. 748. Justice Pratt, speaking for the court stated
on page 750 as follows: "There is no question that the
acceptance by the seller of buyers' past due payments
and its other conduct toward the buyers leading the latter
to believe that strict performance would not be required
by the seller, imposes upon the seller the duty of giving
to the buyer a reasonable notice before it may insist on
strict performance by the buyers."

,
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And in Brown v. Chowchilla Land Co. 59 Cal A
.
,
. pc
164, 210 P. 424 at page 427, the California court tai :
"The requirement of notice after the receipt 0 ; ;:~.
due payments without objection is based upon thee ;
· t h at by his conduct the vendor h quJ
a ble cons1'd erat10n
as 1eo
the vendee into the belief that the former will continu:
to waive the strict performance of the contract."
·c

0

The import of all of the above (and the case law ;'.
explicit on this point) is that where the vendor n~'
waived strict performance of one or more of the pro:
visions of the contract, he must give reasonable notice
of his intention to change his position before insistin~
upon strict performance in the future, at least as to thos~
provisions where he has waived strict performance '.n
the past.
A careful examination of Exhibits P-4, P-5, and P-6
fails to disclose any indication or notice to Appellants
that Respondent intended to shift its position by suddenly refusing late payments and declaring the entire
balance to be due.
4. The jury may well have found that the demand
made by Respondent on or about January 22, 1965 for
payment of the December 15, 1964 payment with a late
charge (Exhibit D-11) constituted a waiver by respond·
ent of the acceleration of the note and mortgage balance
demanded and elected in the letter of January 8, 1965
(Exhibit P-7), and accordingly that subsequent tenders
made by Appellants (Exhibits D-9, D-10 and D-12) pre·
vented acceleration of the mortgage balance by Respond·
ent.
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are entitled to a trial by jury of the issues
rit fact as a matter of law. 78-21-1 and 78-21-2, UCA, 1953.
Huiland \". Wilson, 8 U.2d 11, 327 P.2d 250; Finlayson v.
B:·ady, 121 U.204, 240 P.2d 491. Judge Elton himself ruled
al ume of pretrial that at least one issue of fact remained
,,) be determined by a jury and ordered that a jury be
tm pr.nneled to hear the case (R. 77). Judge Hanson
Jre':iously determined that the case should be heard by
~ .iury and ordered a jury trial (R. 64).
,~ppellants

The decision by Judge Elton that no issues of fact re-

;r,ained to be resolved by a jury (R. 117) and to decide

the case as a matter of law constitutes, in effect, a summan judgment. Accordingly Appellants are entitled for

µurposes of this appeal to have the court survey the
e'.'idence and all reasonable 'inferences' fairly to be
drciwn therefrom in the light most favorable to them.
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U.2d. 30, 395 P.2d. 62.
The party in whose favor a summary judgment is granted
must establish facts such as to preclude all reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce
evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in
his favor. Green v. Garn, 11 U. (2d) 375, 359 P.2d 1050.
The appellant from a summary judgment is entitled to
have all of the evidence and every inference fairly to
be derived therefrom resolved in his favor in the appellate courts. Richard v. Anderson, 9 U(2d) 17, 19, 337
P.2d 59.
It appears obvious that the jury, if permitted to do so,
could well have found the facts to sustain the position of
Appellants on one or more of the foregoing issues which
would have entitled Appellants to win. Accordingly the
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case should be remanded to the District Court fo
. before a Jury.
.
r a ne····
trial
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARy
JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE
The actions by the Court in discharging the jurv d
• an
deciding the issues in the case without hearing evidencP
or testimony (other than the matters stipulated upon
between the parties) constitutes summary judgment ir.
favor of Respondent. Accordingly all disputed issues 0;
fact should for purposes of this appeal be considered :n
manner most favorable to Appellant and all proffers oi
proof should for purposes of this appeal be considered as
established and proven facts. Thompson v Ford Motor
Co., 16 U. 2d. 30, 395 P.2d. 62; Green v. Garn, 11 U.2d.
375, 359 P.2d. 1050; Richard v. Anderson, 9 U.2d. 17 19
' '
337 P.2d. 59.
Acceleration of the entire unpaid balance due on the
note and mortgage is a harsh remedy and should not be
permitted unless the right to do so is clearly established
under the terms of the agreements between the parties.
If Respondent's judgment is to stand it must be by a
clear showing that Appellants were guilty of a de·
fault under the express terms of the note or mortgage,
and that said default had not been waived. If Respond·
ents cannot establish that a right to accelerate in fact
existed on January 9, 1965 then it must fail and the judg·
ment of foreclosure must be set aside and a new trial
ordered. An examination of the Appellants purported
defaults shows that no default in fact existed which under
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the terms of the note and mortgage authorized an acceleration of the unpaid balance. The defaults claimed by

Respondent are as follows:

:: Failure to pay late charges. (R. 131; Exhibits P-4,

i'-J and P-6). The note (Exhibit P-1) does provide for a

:ate charge but does not provide for acceleration of the
.uipaid note balance for failure to pay late charges. Ac·:·1)rdingly failure to pay late charges did not give Re~pondents a right to accelerate the unpaid note and mortgage balance.
2. Failure to pay full amount into reserve for taxes and
i)J,;urance. The note (Exhibit P-1) does not require pay·nent of any amounts into the escrow account but simply
calls for payment of $118. 75 principal and interest. The
mortgage (Exhibit P-2) does require payment into an
escrow account for payment of taxes and insurance. The
mortgage further requires payment of taxes and insurance by Appellants and provides that if Appellants fail to
pay promptly all taxes, assessments, liens, etc. that may
accrue against the property, or for repairs to protect the
property, or to pay the insurance premiums, that the
Respondent may pay said amounts, demand repayment
from Appellants and that the money paid therefor by
Respondent then is secured by the mortgage. The mortgage further provides that Respondent can accelerate
its mortgage balance in the event that Appellants default
in the payment of money secured by the mortgage or
the payment of taxes or assessments. Accordingly nonpayment of money into the escrow fund is not a default
that would entitle Respondents to accelerate the unpaid
balance of the mortgage debt. It is not until Appellants
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have defaulted in the actual payment of taxes
or repai·
ment after demand of money actually expended b . · ·
f
1 Re.
.
spon d ent s m payment o taxes or insurance that
spondents would be entitled to accelerate the m t Re.
or gage
balance. Respondent stipulated that no demand w'.,
made by it for repayment of taxes and insurance paid ~,:.
Respondent after said payments had been made (R i ;
34
Accordingly payment by Respondent of taxes and insur.
ance (which payment appears to have been made after
the attempted acceleration of the unpaid mortgage
balance and accordingly is immaterial to issues in this
case) does not constitute grounds for acceleration because of failure to demand repayment. Failure to pay the
disputed $2.00 per month into the reserve account is not
grounds for acceleration under the terms of the note and
mortgage. In any event no evidence was presented to
show that under the terms of the mortgage Respondent
was in fact entitled to increase the escrow payments by
said disputed $2.00 per month.
In the case of Homeowners Loan Corp. v. Washington
108 U. 469, 161 P2d 355 this court was met with a similar
situation and held that where a note and mortgage required payment by the mortgagee of taxes and assess·
ments and demand for repayment before it could declare
a forfeiture, that a mortgagee which failed to comply
with that provision was not in a position to declare the
entire sum due. Respondents simply have failed to make
the required payment of taxes and insurance and to demand repayment (see stipulation by counsel for Respondents - R. 120) and cannot accelerate the unpaid mortgage
loan because of non-payment of taxes or insurance. If
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RL·siwnclent intends to rely upon rights created under
the terms of the note and mortgage it must comply with
tlic 'cimS of those instruments to create those rights.

:) F,nlure to tender December 15, 1964 payment with
µc,;ment of December 21, 1964 (Exhibit D-8). In the
lei te: of December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) Respondents
"laled that the December 15, 1964 payment need not be
bidered with the November 15, 1964 payment unless it
\\as paid after December 25, 1964. Accordingly the tender
nf December 21, 1964 was not insufficient by reason of
the non-tender of the December 15, 1964 payment. Under
the provisions of 78-27-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
!iespondent \vaived its right to object to the purported
1nsufficiency of the December 21, 1964 tender by failing
,o inclade a demand therefor or to raise any additional
ioJections in the letter of rejection. 78-27-3 reads as
foLlows:

i Ii<:

"Objection to Tender-Must be specified or deemed
waived.-The person to whom a tender is made must,
at the time, specify any objection he may have to
the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed
to have waived it; and, if the objection is to the
amount of money, the terms of the instrument or
the amount or kind of property, he must specify the
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be
precluded from objection afterwards."
4. The amount tendered exceeded the amount due on
the note. The $147.00 tendered (Exhibit D-8) was tendered in payment of the $118.75 principal and interest
due under the terms of the promissory note (Ex. P-1)
with the balance to be credited to the escrow account
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(R. 130-131). Accordingly this tender cut off a
.
th t
ny righ·
a may have theretofore existed for Respondent t'
0
accelerate the mortgage debt balance.

5. December 15, 1964 payment was not in def
au1tat
~ime of acceleration. Under.the terms of the note default
m payment of a monthly mstallment did not give Respondent a right to accelerate until payment was more
than one month past due. (Ex. P-1). Accordingly Respondents cannot rely upon any rights to accelerate
created by non-payment of December 15, 1964 install.
ment because those rights had not yet accrued.

.

6. Respondent waived its right to accelerate mortgaae
balance for non-payment of November 15, 1964 payme~t:
Respondent is also estopped to claim a right to accelerate by reason of non-payment of the November 15, 1964
payment by December 15, 1964 as is clearly shown by the
contents of the letters of December 14, 1964 (Ex. P-4),
December 28, 1964 (Ex. P-5) and January 6, 1965 (Ex.
P-6) wherein Respondent elected to charge a late charge
and made no mention of acceleration of the mortgage
debt balance. Th~ e}{press terms of the promissory note
specify that failure to exercise the option to accelerate
shall not constitute a waiver of the right to exercise that
option in the event of a "subsequent" default. Having
waived its right to declare an acceleration by reason of
the November 15, 1964 payment by electing to accept a
late charge as shown by said letters precludes Respond·
ents by the express terms of said promissory note from
declaring an acceleration except in the event of a "subsequent'' default. The December 15, 1964 payment was
not in default the requisite month required by the ex·
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;:i:·e."s terms of said promissory note (Ex. P-1) and ac;.ccdingly was not a "subsequent" default which would
c'i\itlc Respondents to accelerate the mortgage debt
11 ~,;ance. Having elected to demand payment of the late
charges. :mderpayments into the escrow fund and of the
;\o\·ember 15, 1964 payment the Respondent was not entitled to rely on those purported defaults to declare the
rnnrt;age debt due, but was required to wait for a "subsequent'' default before it could accelerate said debt. Resprmdent failed to do so and its right to accelerate was
clearlY cut off by the tenders mentioned in exhibits D-9
D-10 and D-12.
v

'

':. Respondent waived its purported acceleration by

the subsequent demand for payment of the December 15,
1964 balance with a late charge.

For purposes of this appeal and by reason of the summary nature of the proceedings, the evidence must be
viewed most favorably to Appellant. Accordingly we
must assume that Appellant's contentions that he received a demand for payment of the December 15, 1964
payment together with a demand for payment of a late
charge from Respondent on or about January 23, 1965 (R.
127-128) is true.
Appellants complied with this demand, and in fact
tendered amounts in excess of the amounts requested but
their tenders were refused. (Ex. D-9, D-10 and D-12).
That demand constituted a waiver by Respondent of
any rights that it may have acquired by its letter of January 8, 1965 (Ex. P -7) and the later tenders by Appellants cut off any further right to accelerate.
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CONCLUSION
The minor dispute that arose between the pan··
.
ies cor..
cernmg payment of late charges and the right of Respondent to increase the escrow payment for taxes ar.i
insurance by $2.00 per month does not justify the har,J;
remedy of declaring the entire mortgage due withou·
notice by Respondent. This remedy is in the nature · .
01 u
forfeiture and should not be permitted unless the righ'.
to do so is clear under the terms of the instruments. wP
feel that under the facts no default in fact existed wb:ch
would entitle Respondents to accelerate the mortgage
debt at the time that Respondent attempted to do so. Respondent's refusal of tenders, including tenders by Appellants of all amounts claimed by Respondents as soon
as Appellants learned that Respondent intended to shift
its long established procedure and to accelerate the debt
illustrates that tempers rather than reason created this
problem. Appellants have been deprived of their day in
court and their right to trial by jury of the issues of fact
involved in this matter. To require Respondents to reinstate the mortgage loan and to permit Appellants to pay
that loan over a period of years as the parties originally
agreed would do justice to all parties. Appellants are en·
titled, in view of the summary nature of the proceedings
that resulted in judgment against Appellants, to have all
evidence considered in the manner most favorable to
them. Applying this rule it is clear that Appellants are
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e:itded to have the judgment vacated and set aside, and
rhci r loan reinstated, or that failing, to a new trial be[, re ~1 jury.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for DefendantsAppellants
2870 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone 486-9636

